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"Comitology: Controlling Everyday Rule-Making in the European Union" published on by Oxford University Press.

The Lisbon Treaty fundamentally changed EU legislation. It introduced a new hierarchy of acts, new types of acts, and new decision-making procedures. However, instead of replacing the pre-Lisbon types of acts and procedures, it added to them. The legislative landscape is therefore now more complex than before. However, to political scientists, this complexity represents new opportunities to study power and influence. But these opportunities have been under-exploited so far. The article explains the complex post-Lisbon situation and uses legislative output from the period 2012–2017 to discuss how much the various types of acts and decision procedures are used in practice. The advantages and drawbacks of the EUR-Lex database are discussed and a guide to navigate this database is provided. The article concludes by pointing to the potential of using the full complexity of the post-Lisbon legislative landscape and the EUR-Lex database for analyzing the politics of the EU. ; The Lisbon Treaty fundamentally changed EU legislation. It introduced a new hierarchy of acts, new types of acts and new decision-making procedures. However, instead of replacing the pre-Lisbon types of acts and procedures, it added to them. The legislative landscape is therefore now more complex than before. However, to political scientists, this complexity represents new opportunities to study power and influence. But these opportunities have been under-exploited so far. The article explains the complex post-Lisbon situation and uses legislative output from the period 2012–2017 to discuss how much the various types of acts and decision procedures are used in practice. The advantages and drawbacks of the EUR-Lex database are discussed, and a guide to navigate this database is provided. The article concludes by pointing to the potential of using the full complexity of the post-Lisbon legislative landscape and the EUR-Lex database for analysing the politics of the European Union.

The article asks what governments can do to motivate citizens to engage in co-production. Based on the broader public administration literature we develop a general explanatory model of citizen co-production motivation. In our empirical study we focus especially on the impact of performance information on citizen co-production motivation. We test our model using data from a randomized survey experiment in which some but not all citizens were presented with information on local government school performance. The analysis shows that performance information influences citizen satisfaction with public school services and in turn also has some but weak impacts on their motivation to co-produce.

The article asks what governments can do to motivate citizens to engage in co-production. Based on the broader public administration literature we develop a general explanatory model of citizen co-production motivation. In our empirical study we focus especially on the impact of performance information on citizen co-production motivation. We test our model using data from a randomized survey experiment in which some but not all citizens were presented with information on local government school performance. The analysis shows that performance information influences citizen satisfaction with public school services and in turn also has some but weak impacts on their motivation to co-produce.

Studies show that the EU institutions have strong preferences with regard to the design of the EU comitology system which, consequently, is the result of intense inter-institutional negotiations. However, the exact choice of comitology procedure to install in a given legislative proposal has received much less scholarly attention. Based on a behavioural logic of control maximization, this article investigates the comitology preferences of the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament in the legislative process. The findings from an analysis of all new directives and regulations in the years 1999-2006, a total of 686 acts, show that the Council seeks strict comitology control while the Commission and the Parliament both seek permissive control. This holds even though the legislative process is characterized by a high degree of agreement on comitology. The analysis indicates that this is because the actors strategically anticipate each other's preferences, not because there is a true alignment of preferences. Adapted from the source document.